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ABSTRACT. The new institutionalism in election law aims to lessen the necessity of court
intervention in politically sensitive election administration matters such as redistricting by
harnessing politics to fix politics. Many hope that independent citizen commissions (ICCs) will
improve the politics associated with drawing new district boundaries. As the recent round of
redistricting comes to a close, I offer some observations about ICCs as effective court
redistricting buffers. My basic points are as follows. Independent citizen commissions are the
culmination of a reform effort focused heavily on limiting the conflict of interest implicit in
legislative control over redistricting. While they have succeeded to a great degree in that goal,
they have not eliminated the inevitable partisan suspicions associated with political line-drawing
and the associated risk of commission deadlock. Additional political purity tests and more careful
vetting of the citizen commissioners are not the solution. I argue that ICCs in the future should
adopt a variation of New Jersey's informal arbitration system as a means of reducing partisan
stakes and encouraging coalition building among stakeholders.
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Abigail Hinchcliff, Daniel Hemel, Nick Walter, and Whitney Cloud. Above and beyond the
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Since Baker v. Carr,' state and federal courts have played a more active role
in redistricting at all levels, reviewing the statutory and constitutional
compliance of districting plans and serving as the redistricting body of last
resort when political processes fail. The Supreme Court has taken divergent
paths with respect to political and racial gerrymandering cases, outlining
empirical tests for determining racial violations but essentially failing to settle
on a workable standard for partisan fairness.' Some legal scholars and political
scientists continue to urge the courts to intervene more deeply into partisan
and incumbent gerrymandering issues,4 putting forward new refinements of
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. To be precise, racial discrimination in redistricting can be determined in three ways. A
constitutional standard protects against intentional racial discrimination as outlined in City
of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), which determined that there must a
"racially discriminatory motivation" to show a Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment
violation. There is a three-part racial discriminatory effects test under § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. 1973 (2oo6), amended by Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982). This test was developed in Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S 30, 80 (1986), which established a three-prong test of sufficient size,
cohesion, and racial polarization while concluding that "use of a multimember electoral
structure . . . caused black voters . . . to have less opportunity than white voters to elect
representatives of their choice." Id. In Growe v. Emison, S07 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993), the Court
held that the three Thornburg prerequisites are also necessary to establish a vote
fragmentation claim with respect to a single-member districts. For jurisdictions covered
under § 5, there is a non-retrogression rule developed in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130
(1976), which found that § 5 "has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes
would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Id. More recently, Georgia v.
Ashcroft, 539 U.S 461, 497-80 (2003) reaffirmed that a § 2 vote dilution violation is not an
independent reason to deny § 5 preclearance, and the Court allowed states the latitude to
choose between preserving "a certain number of 'safe' districts" as opposed to a greater
number of influence seats.
3. While the Supreme Court held that partisan gerrymandering was justiciable in Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 109 (1986), it has yet to find a manageable standard for
determining excessive partisanship. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399, 423 (20o6) (plurality opinion) (finding that the appellants had not provided
"a reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders"); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (refusing to
hold that all political gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable but finding that "[t] he failings
of the many proposed standards for measuring the burden a gerrymander imposes on
representational rights make . . . [the Court's] intervention improper").
4. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REv. 593,
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formal redistricting criteria' or fairness formulas' for consideration. But others
think this unwise and seek to lessen the current burden on the courts.
In particular, a new generation of legal scholars is more skeptical of the
Court's ability to act as neutral redistricting referee and seeks instead to buffer
the courts from excessive involvement in line-drawing controversies by
"harness[ing] politics to fix politics."' The suggestions for improving
redistricting politics are varied. For some, it means shaming politicians into
more responsible choices through undesirable comparisons with "shadow"
redistricting efforts.' Others believe that redistricting can be improved by
greater public participation. They advocate for improving the public's capacity
to develop and submit redistricting plans,' or for requiring that redistricting
plans be approved by referenda or adopted by initiative."o Most radically, there
are those who want to take the task of approving new district lines away from
elected officials and give it to independent redistricting commissions." The
goal behind all these ideas is to lessen court involvement by improving the
political processes that must determine the inevitable value and interest
tradeoffs implicit in redistricting.
Realizing the ideal of a re-engineered redistricting politics, however, is not
guaranteed for many reasons. There are many unanswered empirical questions.
Do unfair comparisons with good government plans really shame elected
officials into adopting better plans when political survival is at stake? Do new
efforts at transparency and public input influence the contours of final district
plans in any measurable way, or are they politely ignored? Do citizens know or
care enough about line-drawing to act competently as redistricting deciders?
5. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community, 16o U. PA.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2012).
6. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future ofPartisan Symmetry as a judicial Test for
Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 1, 2 (2007).
7. Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election Law Scholarship, in
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCEsS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 86, 86 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang
eds., 2011).
8. See Heather K. Gerken, Getting from Here to There in Redistricting Reform, 5 DUKE J. CoNST.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 7 (2010).
9. For an attempt to create user-friendly open-source software in order to enhance public
mapping input, see Micah Altman and Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated
Redistricting, 42 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 23 (2011).
1o. See Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting
Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 667, 668 (20o6).
n1. Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REv. 837, 849-50
(1997).
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Do independent redistricting commissions produce better redistricting plans
than state legislatures and other types of commissions?
The Arizona and California independent redistricting commissions are the
boldest departures from the traditional legislative redistricting model. They are
also the natural experiments we can learn the most from because collectively
they embody elements of almost every redistricting reform idea ever proposed,
including greater transparency, options for third-party map submissions,
citizen approval through direct democracy, careful vetting for conflict of
interest, partisan and racial balance, lottery selection, a supermajority voting
rule, and a proclivity towards so-called neutral criteria such as compactness,
respect for city and county lines, and preserving communities of interest. By
design, the combined effect of such features should ideally lead to better, less
controversial redistricting plans, lessening the need for court intervention. But
other features -especially supermajority rules, expedited review, the ability to
trump a commission's product by exercising direct democracy options, the
absence of clear criteria for staff selection, and questions about the impartiality
of the so-called "independent" members - could just as easily lead to political
stalemate, persistent venue shopping by losing interests, and greater public
exposure to heated underlying political disagreements.
As the recent round of redistricting comes to a close, I assess the new
independent redistricting commissions' performance and offer some
observations about their prospects as effective court buffers. My basic points
are as follows. First, commissions generally vary in their separation from
elected officials and their ability to enact district boundaries autonomously.
The independent citizen commissions are the culmination of a reform effort to
limit the conflict of interest implicit in legislative control over redistricting.
Second, to the surprise of no one who has studied redistricting closely,
independent citizen redistricting commissions have not eliminated political
controversy and partisan suspicions. This means that, to date, independent
citizen commissions have not lessened the odds of redistricting-related
litigation or the sore-loser incentive to try to get a better plan out of the courts.
Third, I suggest that too much effort has been focused on the legislative
conflict of interest problem and not enough on the problem of partisan
tensions. Purity tests and careful vetting will never allay partisan doubts.
Political actors will judge proposals by effects, not by the perception of
neutrality. If the trend toward greater partisan polarization continues,
supermajority rules and bipartisan composition could ultimately lead
independent citizen commissions to political deadlocks, particularly if
dissatisfied groups and political parties think they can get a better deal from
the courts or the initiative process. This will weaken the desired buffer for the
courts. Fourth, I argue that independent citizen and politician redistricting
1812
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commissions should adopt a variation of the New Jersey's informal arbitration
system as a means of reducing partisan stakes and encouraging coalition
building among stakeholders. In the end, independent citizen and well-designed
politician commissions offer the courts the best opportunity to defer to
"reasonably imperfect" redistricting plans and to avoid the intrinsically political
task of drawing district boundaries.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMISSION STRUCTURE
Redistricting commissions in various forms have existed for several
decades. Viewed over time and across states, there is an apparent evolutionary
pattern leading to the creation of independent citizen redistricting commissions
in reaction to the redistricting efforts by elected officials and their surrogates.
Commissions broadly fall into four main types: purely advisory commissions to
either the Governor or the legislature; backup mechanisms that kick into action
if the legislature fails to enact a plan in a timely fashion; politician commissions;
and independent citizen commissions."
A. Advisory Commissions
Eight states currently have advisory commissions for either their state
legislative or congressional lines." They vary considerably in the degree of their
independence from state legislators and other elected officials. Iowa's system,
for instance, is closest to the independent citizen commission model in the
sense that the legislature delegates the line-drawing to a bipartisan advisory
commission and a nonpartisan Legislative Services Agency (LSA).1 4 But
critically, the Iowa model differs from the independent citizen commission
because the legislature retains the power to approve or reject the plans
produced by the LSA. For this reason, Iowa is really a "quasi-independent"
commission model. It is independent in the sense that the members of the
five-person advisory commission cannot hold a party position or partisan
12. See JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20-22
(2010); Justin Levitt, All About Redistricting: Professor Justin Levitt's Guide to Drawing the
Electoral Lines, LOYOLA LAW SCH., http://redistricting.ls.edu/who.php (last visited Jan. 22,
2012).
13. See Levitt, supra note 12 (Iowa, Maine, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Virginia); 2oo Redistricting: Governor's Redistricting Advisory Committee and Public Hearings,
STATE OF MD., DEP'T OF PLANNING, http://www.mdp.state.md.us/redistricting/2010/
advisory.shtml (last visited Feb. 24, 2012) (Maryland).
14. IOWA CODE 5§ 42.5-42.6 (2011).
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elected office, or be related to or work for members of the state legislature or
Congress, and that the LSA consists of nonpartisan civil servants. It is not
independent in the sense of having the power to enact a redistricting plan
without legislative approval (i.e., autonomous power). Iowa's advisory
commission is also bipartisan. Four commissioners are appointed by the
majority and minority leaders from both houses of the legislature, and the fifth
is elected to office by the other four. The bipartisan independent commission
works with the nonpartisan LSA to develop congressional and legislative
redistricting plans, which are then submitted to the legislature. The legislature
can make suggestions for changes to the plans that it receives, but must reject
the LSA's plans three times before it can substitute its own plan entirely." As in
the past, that did not happen in 2011. 6
New York's advisory commission, by contrast, is closer to the pure
legislative redistricting model than Iowa's. New York's commission, called
a legislative task force in the statute, consists of four legislators plus two
nonlegislators appointed by the majority and party leaders in both houses. The
legislature can adopt, amend or ignore the commission's recommendations as
it chooses. 7 In the traditional legislative redistricting model (used by
thirty-seven states for their own legislatures and forty-two for Congress), new
redistricting plans are developed by legislative leaders and members exclusively
and are passed in the same manner as other laws. On a continuum of
independence from elected officials, New York's advisory system is only
different from a pure legislative redistricting method by the addition of a few
nonlegislators: it is not independent in the sense of being separated from
elected officials, nor does it possess the autonomous power to enact a
redistricting plan.
The fatal flaw in the advisory redistricting commission model in the eyes of
the reform community is that elected officials retain the power to adopt or
reject the proposed new district lines. Nonetheless, some regard Iowa as a
successful model because the legislature to date has largely deferred to the
LSA's proposals and because the lines seem to comport well with neutral
formal criteria such as compactness, respect for jurisdictional lines, and
protecting communities of interest.'" However, there is no definitive way of
is. Id. § 42.3.
16. See Kay Henderson, Iowa Legislature Approves Redistricting Plan, REUTERS, Apr. 14 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2oll/o4/14/us-iowa-redistricting-idUSTRE 7 3D4GU2o1o414.
17. N.Y. LEGIS. LAw § 83-rn (Consol. 2011).
18. See Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform: What Is Desirable? Possible?, in PARTY LINES:
COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 101-02 (Thomas E.
Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., Brookings Inst. Press 2005).
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determining whether Iowa's success is due to its unique quasi-independent
process or other factors such as the absence of substantial voting rights issues,
a congenial political culture, and minimal regional or geographic variation. To
this day, Iowa's system is more widely admired than copied.
B. Backup Commissions
Backup commissions, like the advisory commissions, typically lack
independence from the influence of elected officials but do have the
autonomous power to enact district boundaries by default. Eight states have
some form of backup commissions, either for their state legislatures only (six
states)," Congress (Indiana),2 o or both (Connecticut)." 'While the exact
composition of the commissions varies considerably, in all instances the
members are either elected officials themselves (often statewide officers such as
the Attorney General or the Secretary of State)" or their designees." Although
the absence of initial line-drawing responsibility is a serious deficiency, the
mere existence of a backup commission can be consequential nonetheless.
Knowing that stalemated redistricting negotiations would throw the matter to
a backup commission can alter the legislative bargaining strategies in certain
circumstances. For instance, if a backup commission has a mandated bipartisan
structure, as it does in Connecticut, but the majority party controls both the
legislature and Governor's office, then the specter of a bipartisan alternative
can give the majority party leadership more leverage over individual majority
party members (i.e., "hold this up by insisting on your selfish demands and we
lose control of the process to the other party"). In states that designate the
composition of their backup commissions by specific statewide offices, the
partisan balance of the commissioners will depend on electoral fate (i.e., which
parties win those offices).
ig. They are Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. IV, S 3), Maryland (MD. CONST. art. III, 5), Mississippi
(Miss. CONST. art. XIII, 5 254), Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. V, 5 11A), Oregon
(OR. CONST. art. IV, 5 6), and Texas (TEX, CONST. art. III, § 28).
20. IND. CODE ANN. 5 3-3-2-2 (LexisNexis 2012).
21. CONN. CONST. art. III, 5 6(b).
22. For instance, Mississippi's backup commission consists of the Chief Justice of the state
supreme court, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the majority leaders of the
House and Senate. MIss. CONsT. art. XIII, 5 254.
23. The majority and minority leaders in both houses of the Connecticut legislature designate
two backup commission members each, as well as a ninth member who must be an elector
in the state. CONN. CONsT. art. III, 5 6(b).
24. Id.
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C. Politician Commissions
"Politician commissions" are composed of elected officials or their
designees. While they are not independent in the sense of being separated from
the power and influence of elected officials, they are autonomous in the sense
that they do not have to submit their plans to the legislature like advisory
commissions or wait until there is a legislative breakdown like backup
commissions. As the label suggests, the politician commission members are
mostly elected officials or their designees. In three instances, the state courts
also have a designee." In five states, the politician commission draws the state
legislative district lines only,26 and in two states (New Jersey and Hawaii),
their commissions draw congressional lines as well." As with the backup
commissions, there are two basic designs of partisan balance: allocation by
office type with only the possibility of partisan balance if some of the
designated offices are held by different political parties"' and explicit party
balance that mandates membership representing both the majority and
minority parties. In addition, a few states (i.e., New Jersey and Colorado)
require that their commissions reflect geographic balance or demographic
diversity."
25. Those three states are Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48), Hawaii (HAW. CONST. art. IV,
§ 2), and Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. art. 11, § 17(b)). In the latter two instances, the court's
appointment power is only invoked when the legislature fails to appoint all positions within
a certain time period or the commissioners cannot agree on the tiebreaking member.
26. They are Arkansas (ARK. CONST. art. 8, § 1), Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48), Ohio
(OHIO CONST. art. XI, § i), Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(h)), and Missouri with
separate commissions for each legislative house (Mo. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7).
27. New Jersey (N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 1) and Hawaii (HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2).
28. One might wonder whether there is any valid justification for using designation by office
type as opposed to explicit partisan balance. The problem with the latter is that unless it is
designed to accurately reflect the existing balance between the two parties, the odds are high
that one of the political parties will be overrepresented in proportion to its normal electoral
strength. Combined with supermajority rules, this can mean that the minority party has a
seemingly unfair advantage in the line-drawing exercise. Designation by office type could be
defended as a more flexible approximation of party balance in the sense that state elected
offices are more likely to be divided as the two parties become more competitive. But it is
still a rough approximation rather than an accurate reflection of party strength, and it brings
with it all the uncertainty about partisan fairness discussed above.
29. In Colorado, no more than four members of the eleven-person politician commission that
draws state legislative lines can live in the same congressional district. There must be at least
one commissioner from each congressional district, including at least one commissioner
living west of the continental divide. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48. In the case of New Jersey's
state legislative commission, the commission members are appointed with "due consideration
to geographic, ethnic and racial diversity." N.J. CONsT. art. II, 5 2.
1816
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Sam Hirsch has argued for a decade that well-designed politician
commissions are a valid reform alternative,30 and I concur with him on this
point. Whereas the premise of the independent citizen commission is that
improvement will come from a more disinterested redistricting body utilizing
neutral formal redistricting criteria, the premise of the politician commission is
that redistricting is a political enterprise that ideally leads to a bargained
compromise between stakeholders. The New Jersey commission, which will be
discussed in some detail later, consists of equally sized contingents of
Democratic and Republican appointees chaired by a tiebreaking member
selected by the commissioners themselves or the by the state supreme court if
the commissioners cannot agree. The advantage of the New Jersey bargaining
model is that it incentivizes both parties to compete for the tiebreaking
member's vote much in the manner that electoral incentives often lead to a
median voter result. In theory, the adopted plan should exhibit more
moderation and consensus. In practice, the New Jersey system depends heavily
on the perceived impartiality of the tiebreaking member, a feature that can be
problematic."
D. The Independent Citizen Commission
The last commission type is the "independent citizen" model. Its
distinguishing features are the separation of the commissioners from elected
officials and the ability to put district lines in place without legislative approval.
The independent citizen commission design is the culmination of a reform
effort aimed at lessening legislators' ability to choose the district lines they run
in (sometimes simplistically characterized as elected officials choosing voters
rather than voters choosing their representatives)." The term for this
problem-i.e., legislators drawing district lines that they ultimately have to run
in-is legislative conflict of interest (LCOI). The various commission types fall
30. See, e.g., Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. Bartels: A Fresh Redistricting Paradigm Emerges in
Newjersey, 1 ELECTION L.J. 1 (2002).
31. For an example of the importance of the independent tiebreaker, see Mark J. Magyar,
Independent Tie-Breaker Promises Open Mind on Congressional Redistricting, NJ SPOTLIGHT,
Sept. 7, 2011, http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/11/o9o7/oooo.
32. I say simplistic because I can attest from my own experience as a redistricting consultant
that legislators are often pressured by their constituents and supporters to shape district
lines in particular ways and that legislators are often loath to ignore their demands for fear
of the electoral or fundraising consequences.
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on a spectrum according to the degree of separation that the commissioners
have with respect to legislative control and influence. 3
Commissions align in a theoretical continuum of increasing separation
from a legislative conflict of interest, spanning from legislative redistricting at
one end to independent citizen commissions at the other. This is displayed in
Appendix A. The rows array the degrees of separation from LCOI, and the two
columns distinguish between state legislative districting and congressional
districting. The zero degree of separation is of course the pure legislative
redistricting. We should note that more states allow the state legislature to
draw congressional (42) than state legislative lines (37) because the legislature's
conflict of interest is more direct when they are drawing their own lines than
when they draw congressional lines.34
The first degree of LCOI separation (separation by dilution) merely adds
citizens or statewide elected officials to a commission mix that already includes
legislators. The second degree (separation by office) excludes legislators from the
commission entirely in favor of statewide elected officials. The third degree
(separation from office) removes elected officials in favor of citizens appointed by
legislative leaders. The fourth degree of separation (separation by independent
pool selection) forces legislative leaders to make citizen appointments from a
pool chosen by a politically balanced body (in Arizona, for instance, the
Commission on Appellate Court Appointments).s And the fifth, and so far
ultimate degree of LCOI separation, is the California Redistricting
Commission (CRC) model in which legislators only get to strike some of the
names from a pool chosen by the state auditor (separation from legislative
designation), and the citizens themselves are carefully vetted to exclude many
normal forms of political involvement.
LCOI separation is one meaning of independence. A second and equally
important meaning of independence is the autonomous power to enact
redistricting plans without the approval of the legislature or elected officials.
On this second dimension, advisory commissions align at the low end, backup
33. For a different approach to classifying types of commissions by their degree of
independence, see David G. Oedel et al., Does the Introduction qf Independent Redistricting
Reduce Congressional Partisanship, 54 VILL. L. REV. 57, 68-8o (2009). This approach accords
the highest independence to commissions that make binding, primary decisions based on
the vote of a "non-political tiebreaker." Id. at 69. My scheme focuses primarily on the
progression of LCOI separation but I recognize that independent citizen commissions
uniquely combine LCOI separation and the autonomy to enact plans.
34. This distinction of course breaks down in the real world since more than a few state
legislators typically set their sights on running for Congress, and the personal and political
ties between state legislators and congressional members are often quite strong.
35. Aluz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)-(8).
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commissions in the middle, and independent citizen and politician
commissions at the top. Understandably, politicians are uncomfortable with
giving up the power to enact lines to commissions that are independent from
them. Thus the correlation between LCOI independence and commission
autonomy is usually an inverse one: the more LCOI-independent the
commission membership, the less autonomous its power (e.g., the politician
commission). Significantly, independent citizen commissions break the usual
pattern between LCOI separation and enactment power.
As with the other commission types, there are shades of difference in the
existing independent citizen commissions that reflect degree of separation
gradations along the two dimensions of independency: LCOI separation and
the autonomy to enact district plans. There are six states that authorize
independent citizen commissions to draw both state legislative and
congressional lines,"6 but two of them have only one congressional seat. 7 At
the low end of a two dimensional index of commission independence is the
State of Washington's system that gives legislative and party leaders the power
to appoint commissioners subject to certain restrictions and allows the
legislature a very limited ability to amend the commission's recommended
districts. Alaska, Idaho, and Montana are slightly higher in the index because
they do not give their legislatures any opportunity to amend the commission's
plans, but allow legislative leaders to make commission appointments subject
to restrictions by elected officials, political party leaders, and lobbyists."
Arizona occupies the next position as it gives the state Commission on
Appellate Court Appointments the job of creating a pool of potential citizen
commissioners that the state legislature must choose from and gives its citizen
commission autonomous power.4 o California also gives the legislature no say
on plan approval but only allows legislative leaders the right to strike two
nominees each from three subpools of twenty each chosen by the State
Auditor.
36. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, S 8-1o; ARIz. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 2, § 1(14); CAL. CONST. art. 21,
§ 2; IDAHO CONST. art. 3, § 2(a); MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(1).
37. Alaska and Montana. See Table 1. Apportionment Population and Number of Representatives, By
State: 2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/
data/files/Apportionment%2oPopulation%2202010.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
3s. See WASH. CONST. art. 11, 5 43(7); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.100 (2012).
39. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, S 8; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; IDAHO CODE § 72-1502 (2oo6).
40. ARIz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, S 1(3)-(8).
41. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8252(b)-(g) (West 2006).
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E. The General Trend
There are several points to make about the general progression of
commissions over the years. First, it highlights how much the recent reform
effort has focused on the LCOI problem even though redistricting controversy
itself stems from many other problems such as partisan fairness, regional
competition, racial underrepresentation, and the like. As we shall see shortly,
those who designed the newest independent citizen commission, the California
Redistricting Commission, went to extraordinary lengths to insulate it from
elected state and federal officials. By comparison, there has been less
innovation on the partisan tension front. Supermajority rules and balanced
membership have long been the best protections against partisan bias, but
those features tend to encourage bipartisan, incumbent protection plans and
safe seats. While the evidence that bipartisan gerrymandering has significantly
caused the country's rising partisanship is thin at best,42 the belief that it at
least might have contributed to polarizing trends has diminished the luster of
bipartisan redistricting plans.43 The recent trend has been to add independent
voters and/or decline-to-state voters (i.e., voters not registered with a political
party) to the commissions, but as I will discuss later, that has not quieted
partisan concerns and suspicions.
Second, there is absolutely no reason to believe that this progression will
end at five degrees of separation. The search for LCOI separation can go
further, eliminating legislative input of any kind and vetting ever more
stringently the citizens and groups that testify before them for any previous
political involvement that might taint their opinions." In the end, a core
42. Two studies conclude that redistricting has had little impact on partisan polarization in the
U.S. House of Representatives. See NOLAN McCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOwARD
ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (20o6);
Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., & Charles Stewart III, Candidate Positioning in
U.S. House Elections, 45 Am. J. POL. SCI. 136 (2001). A third study of partisan polarization in
the California legislature comes to a similar conclusion. See ERIC McGHEE, REDISTRICTING
AND LEGISLATIVE PARTISANSHIP (20o8), available at http://web.ppic.org/content/pubs/
report/R_9o8EMR.pdf.
43. There was a time when bipartisan fairness seemed a desirable reform goal and even received
an ever so mild blessing from the Supreme Court. In Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S 735,
751-54 (1973), the Court held that a "political fairness principle" that achieves a rough
approximation of the statewide political strengths of the two major parties does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause.
44. The disclosure that the Democratic Party seemed to have organized a grassroots effort to
persuade the CRC to draw lines that were more favorable for Democratic incumbents by
organizing witnesses from the local community and flooding the CRC with testimony-
some of which came from front groups or undisclosed paid lobbyists-created considerable
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problem for U.S. redistricting reform is that the system of nonpartisan
expertise is weaker (even, sadly, in electoral administration 5 ) than in the other
Anglo-American democracies that also use single member district rules. Both
the U.S. judiciary and executive branches have a much higher degree of
political permeability than in the other countries, a trait that has increased over
time both in the name of accountability46 and as the unintended consequence
of increasing partisanship. The reform community has turned to citizens as the
answer but in so doing has traded one set of problems for another.
II. ON THE FRONTIER OF REFORM: THE CALIFORNIA REDISTRICTING
COMMISSION EXAMINED
California's tradition is very much to take reform to the next level,
frequently experimenting with policies and institutions that far exceed what
other states regard as the frontier of reform." There were many unsuccessful
attempts at redistricting reform prior to the passage of Propositions n4" and
20," the initiative measures that formed the Citizen Redistricting Commission
and gave it responsibility for drawing state legislative and congressional district
lines. California's experience with redistricting is long and troubled. Twice in
the period since Baker v. Carr, the task of drawing new districts has reverted to
a court-appointed panel of special masters, because, under circumstances of
divided government, the Democratic legislature and Republican Governor
could not come to agreement over a set of maps.
turmoil and may lead to future reforms aimed at further disclosure rules and a more careful
vetting of testimony before the CRC in the next decade. See Olga Pierce & Jeff Larson, How
Democrats Fooled California's Redistricting Commission, PRO PUBLICA, Dec. 21, 2011, http://www
.propublica.org/article/how-democrats-fooled-Californias-redistricting-commission.
45. RICHARD HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORUDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION
MELTDOWN (forthcoming 2012).
46. See RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983) (describing how political
appointees are used to put the administrative structure more in sync with the President's
policies).
47. Bruce E. Cain, Califormulafor Dysfunction, 6 AM. INT. 107, 107 (2011).
48. Proposition 11 (Cal. 2008) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. XXII), available at http://voterguide
.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/title-sum/propil-title-sum.htm.
49. Proposition 20 (Cal. 2010) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. XXI), available at http://cdn.sos.ca
.gov/vig2o1o/general/pdf/english/text-proposed-laws.pdf#prop20.
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A. The Legacy of Failed Reform
The Democrats controlled the process in 1981 and 2001, and in both cases
outraged the reform community, although for different reasons. In 1981, the
Democrats controlled the legislature, and then-Governor Jerry Brown passed a
set of plans over strenuous objections by Republicans. The congressional plan,
fashioned by the savvy and ambitious Democratic Congressman Phil Burton
with the concurrence of the state legislature,so added five seats to the
Democrats' share and contained numerous ostentatiously noncompact
districts.s" After the plan was overturned by referendum in 1982, the two
parties reached an agreement right before Governor Brown was due to leave
office that satisfied the Republicans sufficiently to secure a referendum-proof
two-thirds vote for a slightly modified set of lines. 2 But this experience led to a
decade of lingering bitterness, lawsuits, and ongoing attempts to change the
system.s"
The 1980s redistricting experience was very much on the minds of the
Democrats when they once again had complete control of the process in 2001.
Aware that the direct democracy options posed the risk of expensive ballot
fights over redistricting and that the Democratic candidates at both the state
legislative and congressional level had done very well under the lines given to
them by the 1991 special masters' plan, the Democrats opted for a bipartisan
plan that would lock in their gains for another decade and appease the
Republicans enough to keep redistricting off the ballot. 4 While this strategy
enabled them to pass a timely redistricting plan and avoided an immediate
so. As with Tom DeLay's effort in Texas two decades later, Congressman Burton's outrageous
disregard of traditional redistricting norms was motivated by the desire to enhance his
power in Congress by adding new Democrats to the caucus ranks. Neither the 1982
California nor the 2002 Texas congressional redistricting are usual cases, but they both
figure prominently in the motivations for both political and judicial reform of redistricting.
51. Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 320, 331
(1985).
52. The Long Reapportionment Trail: A Calendar of Confusion and Controversy, CAL. J., March
1983; Redistricting in California: Redistricting 1980, U.C. BERKELEY INST. OF GOVERNMENTAL
STUDIES, http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/research/quickhelp/policy/redistricting/reapp8o.html
(last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
53. See generally J. Morgan Kousser, Redistricting: California 1971-2001, in GOVERNING
CALIFORNIA (Gerald C. Lubenow & Bruce E. Cain eds., 1997) (providing a narrative history
of California's redistricting over three decades and the numerous attempts to reform the
process).
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battle with the Republicans, it too became controversial. Against a backdrop of
rising partisanship and legislative stalemate, critics began to complain that the
price paid for bipartisan peace was too high, robbing the California political
system of competitive seats and centrist legislators who could help bridge the
gap between the distant party bases." Governor Schwarzenegger, for these
reasons, was a leading proponent of redistricting reform, and strongly backed a
2005 special election initiative measure that would have given the line-drawing
process over to a panel of retired judges and mandated a re-redistricting in
2006."
While the 2005 measure failed, the cause of reforming California's
redistricting system was taken up by a powerful and well-funded bipartisan
reform coalition, California Forward. Learning from errors in past drafting
(e.g., combining redistricting with other matters that violated the single
subject rule) and political miscalculations (e.g., embedding redistricting reform
in a package of Republican policy initiatives), California Forward was finally
able to secure the passage of redistricting reform and create the California
Redistricting Commission in two steps -Proposition i, covering the state
legislature, and Proposition 20, extending the scheme to Congress. Even
though one of the implicit motivations behind these measures was creating
more competitive districts in order to achieve more policy moderation, neither
ballot measure included competition as one of its explicit criteria, as an
unsuccessful Ohio measure had done.s" The unstated assumption behind the
55. In fact, while the evidence regarding the effect of the 2001 plan on competitive seats is
strong, the evidence for centrist legislators is not. See ERIc McGHEE, PUB. POLICY INST, OF
CAL., REDISTRICTING AND LEGISLATIVE PARTISANSHIP 1-4 (2008), available at http://www.ppic
.org/content/pubs/report/R_ 9 o8EMR.pdf.
56. Prop, 77 (rejected by Cal. Special Statewide Election, Nov. 8, 2005), available at
http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot pdf/2005s.pdf. On then-Governor Schwarzenegger's
support for the redistricting reform initiative, see Vote "Yes" on Props 74, 75, 76 & 77, JOIN
ARNOLD, http://digital.1ibrary.ucla.edu/websites/2ooS997_oo8/www.joinarnold.com (last
visited Feb. 6, 2012).
57. The Ohio measure defined competitiveness in a manner that only a political scientist could
love. It required that the commission adopt a qualifying plan with the highest
"competitiveness number," as defined "by a mathematical formula, that is the product of the
number of balanced districts multiplied by two, plus the total number of other remaining
competitive districts, minus the total number of unbalanced uncompetitive districts
multiplied by two." Apparently, there were not enough political scientists in the state to tip
the balance, as the measure lost with 30% in favor and 70% against. For the text of the
measure, see State Issue 4: Amended Certified Ballot Language, OHIO SEC'Y OF STATE,
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/elections/Research/electResultsMain/2oo5ElectionsResults/
o5-nio8Issue4/State%2olssue%204%2oAmended%2OCertified%2oBallot%2oLanguage.aspx
(last visited Feb. 6, 2012). For the final vote tally, see State Issue 4: November 8, 2oo5, OHIO
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California effort was that a bipartisan panel of citizens, unconnected to
incumbent legislators and relying on neutral criteria, would create fair and
competitive district boundaries without explicit instructions to do so and
without using political data. In other words, partisan fairness and competition
would be the indirect effect of the commission's composition and adherence to
designated neutral formal criteria (e.g., compactness, respect for city and
county boundaries, following communities of interest, etc.). This assumption
turned out to be controversial in the end as Republican and Latino critics
questioned the fairness of the CRC redistricting proposals for Congress and
the state senate. 8
B. Purging Legislative and Political Influence
It is hard to imagine a more complete effort to squeeze every ounce of
incumbent and legislative influence out of redistricting than the CRC design. It
is probably best described as a ring of defensive tactics, employing multiple
approaches to keep political and incumbent influences out. The first line of
defense was a selection process for the fourteen-member commission that was
explicitly "designed to be extraordinarily fair and impartial, and to lead to a
group of commissioners who would meet the very high standards of
independence and would reflect the population of [the state of California].""
To be eligible, a prospective commissioner had to be a registered California
voter who had voted in two of the last three elections, and who had
continuously registered with the same party, or as a nonpartisan, for the
previous five years. Commissioners were prohibited from holding any elective
office for ten years after service on the CRC, and from serving as paid staff for
the legislature or a lobbyist, at any level, for the subsequent five years.
Applicants were struck from the pool if within the previous ten years, they, or
any member of their immediate family, had (i) been a candidate for, or
appointed to, elected office; (2) been a paid employee or consultant for a
candidate for state or federal elective office, or a consultant for a political party;
SEC'Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/elections/Research/electResultsMain/
20o5ElectionsResults/o 5-1108Issue4.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
s8. See, for instance, Bryan Llenas, California's New Election Map Draws Fire from GOP and
Latino Groups, Fox NEWS LATINO, Aug. 16, 2011, http://latino.foxnews.com/
latino/politics/2oi1/o8/16/new-california-redistricting-passes-but-latino-opposition-remains;
and Jim Miller, Redistricting: Commission Certifies Maps amid Criticism, Looming Challenge,
PREss ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Aug. 16, 2011, http://www.pe.com/local-news-headlines/
201o816-redistricting-commission-certificates-maps-amid-criticism-looming-challenges.ece.
59. CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON 2011 RESDISTRICTING 2 (2011).
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(3) served on a political party's central committee; (4) been a registered
lobbyist; (5) served as paid staff for any of the bodies being redistricted; or
(6) contributed $2000 or more to a candidate for elected office at any level.6 o
The implicit ideal was something analogous to an impartial jury, eliminating
not only those with an insufficient degree of separation from elected officials,
but also those whose involvement in politics might hinder their capacity to act
impartially.
The selection process, conducted by the California Bureau of Audits, was
elaborate and multistaged, featuring elements of a college admissions
application, voir dire, lottery selection, and diversity balancing." After an
extensive outreach effort that garnered more than 36,ooo initial indications of
interest, the State Auditor's Applicant Review Panel (ARP) screened the pool
and invited those who were formally qualified to fill out an extensive
supplemental application that required four essays of 500 words or less, plus
information about education, employment history, campaign finance
contributions over $250, criminal history, and a listing of family members and
related potential conflicts of interest. In addition, applicants had to supply
three letters of recommendation. All of this was posted on the web for public
comment.
Amazingly, 4547 individuals successfully completed these supplemental
forms. This group was then reduced to 120 individuals (forty each from the
pool of Democrats, Republicans, and independents) who were interviewed and
then reduced again to sixty, evenly divided by party classification. At that stage,
the majority and minority legislative leaders from both houses were each
allowed to strike two persons from each of the three party pools, leaving
thirty-six people per pool who moved on to the lottery phase of the
competition. The eight who were chosen by lottery then chose the remaining
six in a manner so as to reflect state diversity, "including, but not limited to,
racial, ethnic, geographic, and gender diversity."" In the end, on account of the
analytic skill requirement, the CRC was diverse with respect to race, gender,
and ethnicity, but not with respect to education and class."
60. CAL. Gov'T CODE S 8252(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2011).
61. Bonnie E. Glaser & Karin MacDonald, Implementation of Proposition ii, Step One: Setting
the Rules, Soliciting Applications, and Forming a Commission (Sept. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
62. See CAL. Gov'T. CODE S 8252(g).
63. All of the members had college degrees and many also had graduate degrees. The CRC's
website We Draw the Lines featured the picture of a worker in a hard hat even though it is
quite likely that none of the CRC had ever worked in one. CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING
COMM'N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov (last visited Nov. 28, 2011).
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The selection of seemingly impartial, diverse, and analytically qualified
individuals was only the first line of defense. The second was an explicit
ordering of neutral criteria as set out in section 2 of article XXI of the California
Constitution. The order of priority was: (i) equal population; (2) Voting
Rights Act compliance; (3) geographic contiguity; (4) respect for the
"geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local neighborhood,
or local community of interest"; (5) compactness; and (6) nesting (i.e., placing
the boundaries of state assembly districts within state senate district
boundaries).64 There are three notable aspects to this approach. First, instead
of regarding criteria as falling into tiered categories (a common way to think of
redistricting criteria), the provision listed the priority exactly in order to limit
tradeoffs between different values. Secondly, the geographic-community-of-
interest criterion was given much more emphasis than in the past. It was
defined as "a contiguous population which shares common social and
economic interests, "6' and the CRC relied heavily on public testimony to define
the community of interest areas.66 The criteria list is notable for what it
excludes: first, the favoring or disfavoring of incumbents, candidates, or
political parties, and, second, the residential location of any political
candidate. 67
Transparency and extensive public input were the next line of defense. The
extent of the CRC's public outreach was staggering: thirty-four public
meetings in thirty-two locations around the state, more than 2700 participants,
651
and over 20,000 written comments. Moreover, the hearings were carried live
64. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d).
6S. Id. § 2(d)(4).
66. The CRC actively solicited testimony to help define communities of interest. On its website,
it asked the public for "[t]he economic and social interests that bind your community
together," "[w]hy your community should be kept together for fair and effective
representation," and "[w]here your community is located." It maintained that "[w]ithout
that information from you, the Commission won't know which communities to keep
together when drawing lines." California Citizens Redistricting Commission's Guide to
Redistricting and the Public Input Process, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM'N (Apr. 19,
2011), http://www.wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/meeting-handouts-apr20/learnmore
20110419 guidebook.pdf.
67. However, party registration data and results from past political races matched to the new
districts were available through free public websites almost immediately after plans were
released by the CRC. See for instance, REDISTRICTING PARTNERS, http://redistictingpartners.com
(last visited Jan. 23, 2012), for the Democrats; and MERIDIAN PACIFIC REDISTRICTING 2011,
http://www.mpimaps.com (last visited Jan. 23, 2012), for the Republicans. The fact that the
CRC was not sequestered like a jury meant that there was no guarantee that the
Commission members were unaware of this data.
68. See CAL. CITIZEN REDISTRICTING COMM'N, supra note 59, at 1.
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by Internet and hearing transcripts made available on the commission's
webpage. The Irvine Foundation established outreach centers around the state
that made software and some computer assistance available to those who
wanted to draw their own maps. Bound by the state's open meeting laws to
make decisions in public (including many legal and personnel discussions that
often are held in executive session), there was little that the CRC could say or
do that was not open for public inspection." The first and all subsequent
versions of the CRC's plans were posted on its web page.
The last line of defense was a supermajority voting rule that raised the
threshold for agreement to a high level. A proposal could not be accepted
unless it obtained the votes of three members of each pool. 70 As it was, the
CRC's commission structure gave the Democrats, the majority party, less than
half of the seats on the commission and Republicans and independents/
decline-to-states a disproportionate amount of leverage.
Taking all this into account, it is clear that by design and in
implementation, California took extraordinary steps to ensure that the
redistricting process would be fair and impartial. By various measures, the
CRC drew maps that adhered fairly closely to the constitutional criteria,
producing boundaries that were more compact72 and more competitive than
the lines they replaced." And yet, the reaction to their plans became
progressively more heated as the process wore on.
C. Reaction to the CRC's Redistricting Plans
Taking stock of the CRC's achievements, we see that its districting plans
made improvements over the 2001 districting plans in several ways, but the
69. The CRC operated under the state's Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act. CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§ 11120-11132 (West 2012). It also streamed its hearings live and made hearing transcripts
available on its website. See Background on the Commission, CAL. CITIZENs REDISTRICTING
COMM'N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/commission.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
70. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(5).
71. In February 2011, 44% of California voters were registered as Democrats, 30.9% as
Republicans, 20.4% as decline-to-state or independents, and 4.7% as other parties. See Mark
Baldasarre, California's Likely Voters, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL. (Aug. 2011),
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication show.asp?i=255. The distribution on the fourteen-
member CRC was five Democrats, five Republicans, and four independent/decline-to-state
members. CAL. CONST., art. XXI, § 2(c)(2).
72. See Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of the Citizens
Commission Final Plans 18 tbl.5 (Sept. 13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/vkogan/research/redistricting.pdf.
73. Id. at 23 tbl.7 .
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commissioners almost certainly could have done better in any one dimension
had they chosen to emphasize it. In short, the commission produced
"reasonably imperfect" plans. For instance, the CRC increased the number of
majority Latino citizen voting age population (CVAP) seats at every level (by
one seat in both the state senate and congressional plans, and by six in the
assembly), but most of the gains occurred between the first draft and final plan
following vigorous objections by the Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (MALDEF) and other Latino groups.14 Although they
achieved many changes, MALDEF was unhappy that its plan-which would
have increased the number of Latino CVAP majority seats even more-was
rejected, and that the CRC did not take other opportunities to create new
Latino seats, especially at the state senate level.7 1
With respect to neutral criteria, the CRC's plans made only modest
improvements except in terms of compactness. The number of census-
designated place splits was reduced at all three levels but the gains in
percentage terms were small largely because the legislature had done quite well
in the previous redistricting cycle.7 6 In the case of counties, there were seven
fewer county splits in the assembly plan but five more in Congress and three
more in the state senate plan than the legislature had in 2001.71 Similarly,
except for the congressional plans, which had been the most extreme of the
2001 bipartisan incumbent protection plans, there was very little improvement
in the number of competitive7' and nested" seats. The only area of obvious
improvement was in the compactness of the seats,So which no doubt accounts
for the generally favorable judgment of the press and public. In the end,
appearance counts for a lot because the other values are harder for the public to
assess.
74. Id. at o-ii tbl.2. For the MALDEF reaction, see Nadra Kareem Nittle, California Minority
Groups Offer "Unity" Redistricting Map, NEWAM. MEDIA (July 7, 2011), http://newamericamedia
.org/2011/o7/unity-map-head-here.php.
75. See Nadra Kareem Nittle, Latest CA Redistricting Maps Satisfy Most Minorities-But Not
Latinos, NEw AM. MEDIA (Aug. 1, 2011), http://newamericamedia.org/2011/o8/latest-ca
-redistricting-maps-satisfy-most-minoritiesbut-not-latinos.php.
76. Kogan & McGhee, supra note 72, at 16 tbl. 3.
77. Id. at 16 tbl.4 .
78. Id. at 23 tbl. 7 .
79. Id. at 19 tbl.6.
Bo. Id. at 18 tbl. 5 & fig.2.
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8,Despite little objective evidence of serious bias, Republicans were
disquieted from the start. Disappointed over the selection of staff" and
suspicious that the nonpartisans on the CRC were closet Democrats who
would vote against Republican interests, the state Republicans expressed their
concern throughout the process." Believing that the CRC's final maps would
give the Democrats supermajority control of the state legislatures and up to a
five-seat gain in the House of Representatives, the Republicans launched
referenda against the state senate and congressional plans, taking advantage of
a provision in the constitution that stays the implementation of the lines and
sends the matter for expedited review by the state supreme court as long as the
referendum appears that it will qualify.4 They also filed suit in the state
supreme court, alleging violations of the state constitution's provisions for
compactness, respect for geographic boundaries, and the integrity of local
jurisdictional lines, but these claims were ultimately rejected."
In short, despite the extraordinary effort to scrub the process of LCOI and
excessive partisanship, some groups and individuals judged the results to be
unfair. The plan was certainly not perfect in this sense, but it was an
improvement over the status quo and within the parameters of reasonably
balanced efforts. The unresolved tension between neutral-procedural and
outcome-fairness approaches could no longer be sublimated. The party that
thought it got less than its fair share of districts took its cause to legal and
direct-democracy venues.
8. The continued decline in Republican registration and the spread of Latino growth into
Republican areas in the Inland Empire and the Central Valley posed problems for the
Republicans from the start. Simulations of the likely Republican and Democratic seat shares
under good and bad year scenarios do not show radical departures from the status quo. See
id. at 26 tbl.8, 29 fig.3.
82. See, e.g., Jim Sanders, Redistricting Panel Chooses Mapmaker After Spirited Debate,
SACRAMENTO BEE: CAPITOL ALERT (Mar. 21, 2011, 9:43 AM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/
capitolalertlatest/2o1l/o3/resolving-one-key-controversy.html.
83. See the various exchanges between Tony Quinn and Steven Maviglio on the Republican
website Fox and Hounds. Search Results, Fox & HOUNDs, http://www.foxandhoundsdaily.com/
?s=redistricting (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
84. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, §§ 2(j), 3(b).
85. See Verified First Amended Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Form of Mandamus or
Prohibition, Vandermost v. Bowen, No. S196493 (Cal. Oct. 26, 2011); Verified Petition for
Extraordinary Relief in the Form of Mandamus or Prohibition at 22-28, Radanovich v.
Bowen, No. S196852 (Cal. Oct. 26, 2011). The California Supreme Court denied both
petitions and the relief sought. Vandermost, No. S196493 (Cal. Oct. 26, 2011); Radanovich,
No. S196852 (Cal. Oct. 26, 2011). The Radanovich plaintiffs have refiled their suit in federal
court. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Radanovich v. Bowen, No. 2:11-cv-
09 786-SVW-PJW (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, zo11).
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III. THE ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION
REDUX
In the 2001 redistricting round, the Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission 6 (AIRC) defined the cutting edge of redistricting reform, taking
the effort at limiting LCO1 to the fourth degree by restricting the pool of
potential commissioners from which the majority and minority party
legislative leaders could choose to twenty-five individuals selected by a judicial
selection commission. The five AIRC members consisted of two each from the
major political parties and one independent. No more than two could come
from any one county. The 2000 initiative measure that created this system,
Proposition 1o6,87 also mandated that redistricting plans start from scratch,
modifying an initial grid plan according to traditional criteria such as
compactness, contiguity, and community of interest, and to the extent possible
relying on visible geographic features and undivided census tracts. The
commission could not consider incumbency considerations nor use political
data in the construction of the initial grid but could use political data to test for
VRA compliance and other goals.
A. The Path to a Commission
Prior to the passage of Proposition io6, Arizona, like California, had
experienced a troubled redistricting history. The state's 1971 plan was
overturned by a district court for splitting the Navajo tribe reservation into
three separate state legislative districts and replaced by a court-drawn plan." In
1981, the Republican-controlled legislature passed a redistricting plan that was
vetoed by the Democratic Governor, Bruce Babbitt.' The Republicans were
able to override the veto,9 o but their plan did not get Justice Department
clearance and was rejected by a federal court for diluting the Native American
vote and failing to achieve sufficiently equal population.91 Ten years later, the
86. I was able to observe the Arizona commission as the court-appointed Special Master in
2002.
8. Proposition 1o6, in ARz. SEC'Y OF STATE, 2000 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS 54 (2ooo), available at
http://www.azsos.gov/election/2000/info/pubpamphlet/english/proplo6.pdf.
88. Barbara Norrander & Jay Wendland, Redistricting in Arizona, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND
REDISTRICTING IN THE WEST 177, 178 (Gary F. Moncrief ed., 2011).
89. Id. at 178-79.
go. Goddard v. Babbitt, 536 F. Supp. 538, 541 (D. Ariz. 1982).
gi. Norrander & Wendland, supra note 88, at 178-79.
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Democrats and Republicans each controlled one state legislative house and
could not agree on a redistricting plan, forcing a federal court to impose one."
However, Hispanics objected to the fact that the court's plan did not properly
account for polarized voting and that it was not sent to the Justice Department
for preclearance.9 ' The legislature then drew up a new plan,9 4 but it and a
subsequent redraft were both rejected by the Justice Department for failing to
produce enough majority minority districts.95 Finally, a third plan was accepted
for the 1994 elections. 96
Against this background of recurring redistricting turmoil, Proposition io6
went on the ballot in 2000 with the support of reform groups (namely,
Common Cause and the League of Women Voters) and the Democratic Party,
eventually winning by a margin of 56.1% to 43-9%.9 Republicans were more
supportive of redistricting reform in California (where they were in the
minority) than in Arizona (where they were the majority party).9" In
redistricting matters, where one stands (on reform) depends on where one sits.
Especially in states where the prospect of the minority party ever gaining
legislative control are dim to nonexistent, the outside party is usually more
willing to experiment with new processes.
The five-person Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission is selected
by the four majority and minority party legislative leaders, but the citizen pool
they choose from is initially reviewed and chosen by the state's Commission on
Appellate Court Appointments." The twenty-five finalists are divided into





g6. Id. at 179.
97. BETSEY BAYLESS, ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, 2ooo ANNUAL REPORT 44 (2ooo), available at
http://www.azsos.gov/public services/annual report/2000/annual report.pdf; David K.
Pauole, Race, Politics, and (In)Equality: Proposition 1o6 Alters the Face and Rules ofRedistricting
in Arizona, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1219, 1221 (2001); Rhonda L. Barnes, Comment, Redistricting in
Arizona Under the Proposition io6 Provisions: Retrogression, Representation, and Regret, 35 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 575, 577 (2003).
98. Arizona Republican legislators opposed Proposition io6, see Norrander & Wendland, supra
note 88, at 18o. In California, Proposition 20 was put on the ballot by Charles Munger, a
Republican donor. See Gerry Shih, Tackling Redistricting with Money and Zeal, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct 7, 201o, http://www.nytimes.com/2olo/1o/o8/us/o8bcredistrict.html.
99. ARuZ. CONsT. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3)-(8).
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registered with either party."oo Based simply on political science research about
those who designate themselves as independents/decline-to-states, there was
reason a priori to worry about whether that label would hold up under the
intense pressure of partisan scrutiny. Most independent/decline-to-state voters
are actually "partisan leaners," meaning that they vote disproportionately for
one party over the other. Only a minority of these voters swings to both parties
with almost equal frequency.' To the inner political world of party officials,
elected representatives, consultants, and activists, this means that people who
call themselves independents are more often than not closet partisans. This was
not much of a problem for Arizona in 2001, but it became the center of
controversy in 2011.102
The initial experience with Arizona's commission in 2001 was, on balance,
positive enough to encourage the California reform community to adopt a
similar, if more complex, model. The AIRC, however, was not able to forestall
litigation. The commission's first set of maps was challenged by the Justice
Department for violating the section 5 retrogression standard by reducing the
number of majority-Latino voting age population (VAP) districts by three. 0 3
The maps were then revised and precleared. However, the state maps were also
challenged in state court for, among other things, failing to comply with the
state constitutional requirement to draw competitive districts when "it was
possible to do so.""o' While the Arizona Supreme Court ultimately rejected this
claim,'0o the underlying conundrum concerning competitiveness was never
addressed.
If the AIRC was supposed to draw the initial grid lines without reference to
incumbency or political data, to avoid retrogression by maintaining the same
level of majority minority districts (which are inherently noncompetitive) and
to adhere primarily to neutral formal criteria, how much room was there
realistically for the constitutionally subordinate goal of creating new
oo. Id.
1o. BRUCE E. KEITH ET AL., THE MYTH OF THE INDEPENDENT VOTER, at Xvi (1992).
102. One can only speculate as to why 2011 turned out to be more partisan. Partisanship generally
rose in the United States in the intervening decade, but timing might have also had
something to do with the outcome. The Arizona commission got a late start, and by then,
the Republican complaints in California were mounting.
103. Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Lisa T. Hacker
& Jose de Jesus de Rivera, AIRC (May 20, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec
5/az obj2.php.
104. Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 208 P. 3d
676, 682 (Ariz. 2009).
105. Id. at 689.
1832
121:18 08 2012
REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS: A BETTER POLITICAL BUFFER?
competitive seats? This is a prime example of the central tension between
neutral criteria versus desired reform outcomes such as creating more
competitive seats. The implied reform assumption was that the former would
lead to the latter, but that is only true sometimes. In California, the baseline
2001 districts (especially the congressional districts) were so skewed by the
legislature's extreme bipartisan 2ool plan that the CRC could not help but
increase the number of competitive seats even without looking at political data
and by following neutral criteria. Even so, the gains in California were
relatively modest.1o6  Similarly, the AIRC in 2001 did little to increase
competitiveness in Arizona.0 7
B. The 2011 AIRC Experience
Entering the 2011 redistricting, there were two possibilities: (1) the AIRC
would build on its reasonable success in 2001, or (2) with experience and
knowledge of the process under their belt, the parties and political players
would game the system more effectively. The answer, unfortunately, turned
out to be the latter. As in California, partisan suspicion and disappointment
over the likely political consequences of the new lines undermined the AIRC
design. Both the CRC and AIRC were well insulated from incumbent
self-interest, but less well protected from partisan expectations. In particular,
two features proved to be problematic. First, because redistricting is a technical
exercise, commissioners necessarily rely upon staff with geographic
information system (GIS) skills (i.e., the ability to actually draw the lines),
those with statistics training to do the Voting Right Act section 2 analysis, and
legal counsel specializing in voting rights law. This sets up principal-agent
problems based on asymmetries of information. In theory, the technical staff
could steer commission decisions in a given direction by skewing the advice
and options it gives to the commissioners. Even the suspicion that they might
do so is poisonous. Second, in the AIRC bipartisan structure, the member
registered as independent/decline-to-state acts as chair and the tiebreaker in
the event that the partisan members cannot agree. If one party believes that an
1o6. The Kogan and McGhee study estimates that the predicted number of competitive seats rose
between the baseline 2001 map to the 2011 final plan from 11% to 15% in the state senate,
from 11% to 14% in the assembly, and from 5% to 18% in Congress. See Kogan & McGhee,
supra note 73, at 23, tbl.7 .
107. Norrander & Wendland, supra note 88, at 191 (finding little evidence that Arizona's election
became more competitive after 2002, as measured by the number of unopposed seats,
average margin of victory, wins by ten points or less, and bias between seats won and total
votes).
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independent/decline-to-state member is really a closet partisan, the legitimacy
of the whole exercise falls apart.
In California, the CRC addressed the staff expertise problem by taking a
more hands-on approach to drawing the lines rather than relying on staff to
generate all the options.os The question of whether nominally nonpartisan
commissioners were really closet partisans was problematic in California as
well, but lessened somewhat by having four who claimed to be independent
voters and rotating the chair responsibilities among all the commissioners.'o9
The AIRC on the other hand was never able to overcome its staffing fight and
had only one independent/decline-to-state voter as the deciding chair. The
decision to hire a Democratic consulting firm, Strategic Telemetry, became a
major controversy. Republicans alleged that the independent chair politicked
on behalf of the Democratic firm in violation of the state's open meeting laws
and destroyed relevant documents.' The state Attorney General's office
launched an investigation even as the AIRC proceeded with its hearings. After
the congressional draft plan was released, appearing to make some Republican
seats more competitive and potentially giving the Democrats gains, the
Republican Governor and legislature became convinced that the fix was in, and
summarily removed the chair on a party line vote."' The court subsequently
restored the chair."'
C. Lessons from the AIRC and CRC
There are several common flaws in the Arizona and California independent
citizen commission designs that are particularly problematic in an era of
heightened partisanship. To begin with, neither design accounted for the
staffing issue clearly. Both commissions were explicitly balanced in their
membership, but there was no specific provision or guidelines about the
los. E-mail from Karin MacDonald, Mapping Consultant to Cal. Redistricting Comm'n, to
author (Feb. 24, 2012, 5:43 PM) (on file with author).
iog. The chairmanship was rotated on a regular schedule. See Background on Commission, CAL.
CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM'N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/commission.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2012).
io. Paul Davenport, Arizona AG: Panel Member Said Documents Destroyed, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 8, 2011, available at http://www.myfoxphoenic.com/dpp/news/politics/state-politics/
arizona-ag-panel-member-said-documents-destroyed-apx-o9082011.
ill. Ginger Rough, Arizona Redistricting Panel Won't Be Changed by Brewer, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
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technical and legal staff they would employ. Most redistricting consultants
have worked for one or the other party, which, given the political sensitivity of
the task, is understandable."' Similarly, most lawyers who specialize in voting
rights cases or redistricting tend to align with one party or the other. If the
commission is balanced by party affiliation, then should the staff be also?
Would a bipartisan staff even be able to work together harmoniously?
Another problem is whether the seal on legislative interference and control
is tight enough. In both California and Arizona, the independent commissions
have to rely on the legislature for funding, not just before and during the
redistricting cycle, but after as well. Since litigation and various cleanup
matters can extend for years into the period after the commissions' redistricting
plans have been disclosed to their state legislatures, it sets up a situation that at
best is awkward and at worst compromises the commissions' independence
and sets them up for potential retribution. The total budget for Arizona's 2001
Independent Redistricting Commission was $9,544,1oo, 63% of which was
spent after 2002.114 The California Redistricting Commission seems to be on a
similar path of extended life and continued expenditure. It received an initial
allocation of $2,375,000 in FY 2010-2011 but then needed additional allocations
amounting to $3,470,000 through FY 2011-2012 for a total of $5,845,000, with
a projected shortfall of $2,570,371."' Litigation alone is likely to cost the CRC at
least $2,863,7471" Given the unavoidable legal and political uncertainty that
comes with line-drawing in the modern era, independent citizen commissions
cannot be expected to disappear when they issue their lines. But depending
financially on the legislature for funding could prove problematic if the
legislature is not happy with the commission's product.
113. As an attempt to create a natural experiment in staffing bipartisanship, I agreed to be an
affiliated consultant with a Republican team applying for the Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission staff mapping contract, thinking I could test the bipartisan
staffing model personally. I was told by my Democratic friends that I had lost my mind and
values. In the same redistricting cycle, I was demonized by California Republicans for
my involvement in the 1981-1982 state redistricting (despite having established a
noncontroversial, nonpartisan data center at Berkeley), and criticized by Democrats for my
bipartisan gesture. This does not bode well for the bipartisan staffing model. I suspect that
the Iowa Legislative Services Agency is a better model for staffing, leaving the politics to the
commissioners.
114. JOINT LEGISLATURE BUDGET COMM., STATE OF ARiz., FISCAL YEAR 2012 APPROPRiATIONS
REPORT 136 (2011), www.azleg.gov/jlbc/12app/FY2o2AppropRpt.pdf.
115. Citizen Redistricting Commission Expenditure Summary: Estimates Through January 31, 2012,
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Even more problematic than lack of financial independence is the capacity
of the legislature to interfere in a commission's operations. In Arizona, the
Governor and legislature have the capacity to remove AIRC members for
"gross misconduct,"". which can apparently mean proposing boundaries that
the majority party does not like. Displeased with the conduct of the AIRC's
independent chair, the Governor of Arizona, Jan Brewer, attempted to remove
her. In the end, the Governor was rebuffed by the Arizona Supreme Court,"
but the existence of this option certainly compromises the commission's
independence and places the courts in the position of having to protect the
commission. Tensions with the majority party in the legislature are a real
threat. They did not manifest themselves in California because the majority
party was reasonably content with the CRC lines. Tensions flared up in
Arizona's case because the majority party was not happy with the commission's
work. The prospect of a minority party winning the redistricting sweepstakes
under a commission system reverses the time-honored political logic of "to the
winner go the spoils" and tests the political majority's tolerance for outcomes it
does not favor.
A third problem highlighted by the recent experiences in Arizona and
California directly relates to the aspiration that independent citizen
redistricting commissions can serve as better buffers for the courts. It should be
taken as a given in any reform design that political players will game the
system, looking for strategic advantage over their opponents and responding
rationally to the new institutional incentives that they face. In particular,
redistricting is bedeviled by the sore loser problem: because new district lines
can determine the electoral fates of candidates, political parties, and interest
groups, it is usually worth their time and effort to overturn a plan that they do
not like for the uncertain prospect of something better. Court-drawn
redistricting plans are not as easily predicted as legislatively enacted ones, but
in my experience, political practitioners believe that judges favor the parties
that nominated or elected them. There is also some empirical evidence for
this."' But even if this belief is mistaken, a redistricting sore loser might so
117. The Governor had to demonstrate "substantial neglect of duty, gross misconduct in office,
or inability to discharge the duties of office" under article 4, part 2, section 1(io) of the
Arizona Constitution. See Order, Mathis v. Brewer, No. CV-11-o313-SA (Ariz. 2011),
available at www.azcourts.gov/clerkofthecourt/SeparateOrders.aspx.
118. Id.
iig. See Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in judicial Research: Reapportionment
in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. SO. REV. 413, 417 (1995) (showing that district court
judges voted against redistricting plans presented by their own party at a lower rate than
plans presented by the other party).
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dislike a proposed redistricting plan that he or she would prefer any chance of a
better plan from the courts to what a commission offers.
As a consequence, the pathways to legal review matter very much. The
argument for expedited review is that it allows challenges to district lines to be
resolved quickly so that election officials can move ahead with implementing
the ballot and precinct changes necessary to conduct the upcoming election.
Since the timetable is tight and the financial and administrative consequences
of postponing elections are dire, it makes sense to resolve legal uncertainties
quickly. But the incentive effect of expedited review is to encourage challenges,
especially if the courts have the power to impose temporary lines while legal
matters are sorted out in a lengthy trial process. California's law adds a special
twist. Not only does it provide for expedited review by the state's supreme
court, but it provides the option for the court to stay the implementation of
new lines if there are enough signatures during the qualifying stage of a
referendum campaign against a plan. 2 o This is in fact the strategy that the
California Republican Party pursued."' Again, if the goal is to buffer the courts
from being dragged into redistricting disputes, the threshold for legal
intervention should be carefully evaluated in light of the various checks and
bipartisan guarantees built into the independent citizen commission model.
IV. LESSENING THE PARTISAN EDGE
No doubt, there will be reform-led attempts to patch these problems in the
coming years. But the question remains: absent an agreed-upon definition of
fair outcomes and a continued trend of strong partisanship, can independent
citizen or politician commission systems arrive at outcomes that will be
regarded as sufficiently fair by the political parties to dampen disputes and
keep the courts from having to take over the line-drawing process? Fair
procedures are no guarantee that all parties will be happy. Degrees of
separation only insulate from incumbent self-interest. A truly bipartisan
structure risks the prospect of stalemate and an incumbent gerrymander, but
using independent members to break partisan deadlock can feed the perception
of hidden bias. If the belief in original sin with respect to those who claim to be
politically independent cannot be eliminated, can it at least be minimized?
12o. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(i)-j).
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A. The Informal New Jersey Bargaining System
One possible solution might be incorporating the New Jersey bargaining
system into the independent citizen commission system. As discussed
previously, the formal New Jersey system is usually lumped with other
"politician" commissions in scholarly classifications, based on its lower degree
of separation from politician self-interest.m' The members of the commission
for drawing congressional lines are appointed by the two majority and two
minority party leaders plus the two chairs of the state Democratic and
Republican parties, each of whom gets two selections. The thirteenth or
tiebreaking member is chosen by the other twelve or by the state supreme court
if they cannot agree. The thirteenth member is restricted from having held
political office in New Jersey within the last five years. Similarly, the
commission for the state's legislative lines is chosen by the two state party
chairs (with five appointments each) and the eleventh member by the other ten
or the state supreme court in the event of a stalemate.123 On the face, it is
simply another first-degree separation-by-dilution commission.
However, the New Jersey model has some interesting "informal" features
that separate it from other politician commissions and offer clues as to how the
pervasive partisan paranoia, staff bias, and political original sin problems
might be handled differently." First, the two party delegations are invited to
present competing plans in an iterative fashion. Second, they are given specific
goals to compete over, such as creating competitive seats, minimizing party
bias, and retaining voters in the same districts to the degree possible. The plans
must of course meet the explicit federal constitutional criteria such as equal
population, contiguity, and adherence to the VRA, but the winning plan is the
one that scores best on the so-called subordinate or state criteria.
This system has several virtues. Most importantly, it induces competition
between the party factions based on whatever desirable characteristics a state
might want to emphasize. The New Jersey law leaves the criteria determination
to the tiebreaking member. It would be better in my estimation to set these
goals out formally in either an initiative measure where possible or a statute,
122. LEVITT, supra note 12, at 21.
123. N.J. CONST. art. II, § II, paras. 1-2.
124. The primary advocate for wider use of the New Jersey bargaining system is Sam
Hirsch. See Sam Hirsch, Jenner & Block LLP, A Proposal for Redistricting Reform:
A Model State Constitutional Amendment (conference paper presented at the
Am. Mathematical Soc'y's Special Session on "The Redistricting Problem," Jan. 8,
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preferably at least four years before the next round of redistricting to maintain
some semblance of a "veil of ignorance" impartiality to the reasoning behind
why some criteria are emphasized. The iterative bargaining process has a
desirable median outcome effect that fits nicely with a "reasonably imperfect"
normative framework. If we take as working premises that all redistricting is
political, that any plan will likely be considered unfair by somebody, and that
the best outcome is a redistricting plan that fits within the bounded set of
"reasonably imperfect plans," the iterative bargaining framework provides an
incentivized path to the middle and away from extreme outcomes. If partisan
bias is included and measured with multiple indicators including the
distribution of partisan registration and normal votes, seats-votes curves,"' and
each party's incumbent displacement count (i.e., the number of incumbents
who are drawn out of their districts given their legal residence), the differences
between party preferred plans might become less stark over the course of the
bargaining, lowering the stakes of losing. The inevitable heat associated with
redistricting cannot be turned off, but it can be reduced.
B. Graffing the Bargaining System into the Independent Citizen Commission
Structure
That said, the New Jersey plan can be improved by grafting it to citizen
commissions and changing the commissioners' role from drawing lines
themselves to judging the competition between all plans, or amending and
adopting the best plan as their own. Many states have already taken steps to
encourage online, public submissions of redistricting plans, but it is unclear
whether any of these ideas and plans had much effect, even in the commission
states. Several election law scholars"' have initiated shadow redistricting
efforts aimed at providing better examples of balanced plans, and while they
received some press and possibly influenced the deliberations in a few
125. Seats-votes curves plot seat shares against vote shares and can be used to derive estimates of
bias and responsiveness in redistricting plans. See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified
Method of Evaluating Electoral Systems and Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. ScI. 514, 534-38
(1994).
u26. Two examples are the Columbia University project, DrawCongress.org, run by Professor
Nathaniel Persily and the Public Mapping Project run by Professors Michael McDonald and
Micah Altman. See DrawCongress.org, COLUMBIA LAW SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/
redistricting (last visited Nov. 28, 2011); Micah Altman & Michael McDonald, Public
Mapping Project, PUB. MAPPING PROJECT, http://www.publicmapping.org (last visited Nov.
28, 2011).
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instances,'2 7 their work would have been more influential if it had been entered
in a "reasonably imperfect" competition. Placing commissioners in the position
of judging the competition as opposed to drawing their own lines will in my
experience lessen the political pressure upon them."" The state would save a
great deal of money on consultants, because, like open source coding, a
competition among submitted plans would push the time, expense, and effort
onto those in the public who care enough to enter. 9 Opening the competition
to the general public as well as political professionals lessens the dangers of
collusive cooperation between the parties and potential staff bias. The
neutrality of nonpartisans on state commissions might still be questioned, but
having several (as in California) rather than one (as in Arizona) would lessen
the focus on any given individual and the general suspicion about closet
partisans to some degree.
Most importantly, however, the competition's goals should be twofold.
First, it should lessen the partisan differences over proposals by directing the
iterative bargaining toward a median outcome. The intuition is this: the
smaller the differences between the plans, the lower the stakes of losing,
hopefully lowering the risks of expensive legal challenges and efforts to
obstruct the implementation of the commission's plan. In addition, the
incentive to form coalitions in order to demonstrate support addresses a major
problem with public input in redistricting. In my experience, too many
individuals and groups simply use their opportunity to testify to reiterate
parochial demands about preserving the integrity of their neighborhoods and
political jurisdictions. They often reject what seem to me to be fair tradeoffs
and compromises, such as allowing a community to be split at one level (e.g.,
Congress) in return for being kept whole at another (e.g., both houses of the
state legislature). Much of the effort in redistricting reform to date has focused
on elected officials, but legislators and statewide officials have never simply
drawn lines in a political vacuum. Activists and interest groups have always
127. On June 7, 2011, two citizens testified before the CRC arguing in favor of a Columbia
University plan developed by Professor Nathaniel Persily's student group that kept a
Tri-Cities portion of the Bay Area whole in redistricting. See In the Matter ofFull Commission
Business Meeting (Volume I) (Cal. Citizens Redistricting Comm'n, July iS, 2011), available at
http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/201107/transcripts 20110715_sacto
voli.pdf.
128. I ran the 1993 Oaldand city redistricting in this manner and managed to keep the city
council out of the line of political fire for the most part. Only at the end, when one city
councilman decided to make a small change to the map, did it cause some controversy.
129. Aside from organized groups, there is an abundance of people with narrow enough
definitions of fun to devote hours to the exercise. I am ashamed to say that I have never
done it for free.
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played a role. Other than empowering them with more opportunities to
observe, testify, and submit, there has been little or no attention to the
incentives or input quality of these interested individuals and groups.
The idea that disinterested citizens will come forward in great numbers and
channel commissions of any type in the direction of some pure public interest
is naive."' The "iron law of oligarchy"' 3 ' applies in force to redistricting. In my
opinion, it is better to accept the reality that the interested portion of the public
will continue to provide most of the input, and reformers should work on
improving the quality of their input. There is a roiling controversy in political
science as to whether partisanship starts at the top (i.e., the elected officials
themselves)"' or the bottom (i.e., public opinion),"3 but it is likely that the
middle (i.e., the activists and interest groups) also plays a critical role. If we can
take the edges off activists' input and encourage more compromises at the
middle level, then perhaps we can lessen the tension at the commission level as
well.
V. THE PROMISE OF INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS ASSESSED
If the goal is to buffer the courts from excessive involvement and to
"harness politics to fix politics,"'3 4 what can we conclude about the promise of
independent redistricting commissions? First, independent commissions
cannot be expected to eliminate political controversies over line-drawing.
130. In research conducted under my supervision, Anthony Ramirez took a sample of seventeen
CRC meetings and looked at who testified before them. In some cases, the testifiers
identified their affiliations, but in many cases, he had to search the Internet to discover their
connections. Of the one hundred and twenty-three separate testimonies, he was able to
identify that ninety-nine were from individuals affiliated with interest groups ranging from
the California Conservative Action group to California Forward, the group that pushed for
the CRC redistricting reform and monitored its progress closely. In twelve instances, the
individuals were local public officials. See Anthony Ramirez, Where Are the Citizens? Not
Here (Oct. 26, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
131. The concept and term originated in ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden & Cedar Paul
trans., 1915).
132. See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?
THE MYTH OF A POLARiZED AMERICA (3d ed. 2010) (arguing that partisan polarization is
more evident in political elites than mass opinion).
133. See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Is Polarization a Myth?, 70 J. PoL. 542
(2008) (finding that ideological divisions have increased among voters as well as elites,
especially among the best informed, most interested, and active voters).
134. Gerken & Kang, supra note 7, at 86.
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Redistricting scholars have long maintained that the placement of boundaries
inevitably pleases some and not others. 3 s Every plan affects incumbents,
interest groups, and political party prospects differently. Some cities, counties,
and neighborhoods inevitably do not get what they want and are either divided
between districts or not placed with the neighboring areas they prefer. Good
government groups want lines drawn according to neutral criteria, and voting
rights groups want a fair share of representation based on expectations of likely
outcomes. There are too many goals that need to be realized simultaneously to
please everyone, particularly in large and diverse states. The upbeat optimism
of the public testimony in the California hearings before the first release of the
CRC's plans contrasted sharply with the angry denunciations in certain parts
of the state and among some groups after the new lines were revealed."'
Greater transparency and openness to public input might have the ironic effect
of heightening the expectations and disappointment of those who do not get
what they want from the reformed redistricting process.
The corollary to the first point is that at least in the short run, independent
commissions might not diminish appeals to the court for redress. Arizona's
commission was sued in 2001, and it had already been challenged in court even
before it drew any lines in 2011.1" California's commission was both in court
and facing referenda almost immediately upon completion of its work.' 8 As
long as the courts offer a chance to appeal, we should expect groups that are
unhappy with the results to pursue legal challenges. The temptation to sue is
likely greater when challenges are granted expedited review and when
referenda can prevent the implementation of a plan even before the electorate
votes on it.'9 Politics is fought in the short run, and even a one-election-cycle
advantage can be a strong motivation to act. Most importantly, even the most
extraordinary efforts at constructing an impartial process in California did not
allay partisan suspicions nor guarantee widespread satisfaction with results.
Successful challenges this round will encourage more challenges in the future.
To some degree, the courts control their own fate if they want independent
commissions to be buffers. The courts might consider a higher level of
135. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in
the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1, 73 (1985).
136. See, e.g., Olu Alemoru, California Redistricting Maps Draw Angry Response, L.A. WAVE, July
13, 2011, http://www.wavenewspapers.con/news/local/west-edition/California-redistricting
-maps-125543443.html.
137. Adamsv. Comm'n on Appellate Court Appointments, 254 P.3d 367, 369-70 (Ariz. 2011).
138. Wisckol, supra note 121.
139. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 3.
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deference to redistricting institutions such as independent citizen commissions
that are more likely to adopt reasonably imperfect plans.
The most important feature of independent citizen commissions in the
future may turn out to be not their degree of separation from incumbents or
politics generally, but their capacity to negotiate to meet supermajority vote
thresholds and agree on reasonably imperfect plans (i.e., good redistricting
deliberation). There is no way to satisfy all redistricting constraints, but the
need to compromise on these various goals in order to get enough votes to
please a supermajority should reduce the odds of outlier plans that go to
extremes to achieve partisan or incumbency goals.140 While this may not satisfy
the political groups that feel they got the short end of the stick in terms of
district outcomes, it should be enough for the courts. In the end, the
effectiveness of buffers will hinge to some degree on the respect that courts
accord to them.
Given the goals of compromise and achieving reasonably imperfect plans,
independent citizen commissions might not be the only candidates for
buffering. Politician commissions that employ a political arbitration model,
adopt transparency requirements, and encourage meaningful public
participation might also serve as effective buffers.
In the end, political thickets can be pruned even if they cannot be removed
entirely. The new election law institutionalism does not try to replace politics.
It aspires to improve it enough to prevent substantial and widely perceived
unfairness. The next round of improvements to independent citizen
commissions or other commission structures should seek to increase the
incentive to make compromises, including among those who testify and submit
proposals to the commissions, rather than adding more degrees of separation
in the search for greater political purity. The key is not whether line-drawers
have prejudices, but whether they can set them aside enough to reach a
bargain. As long as the process encourages individuals and groups to hold fast
to their demands and expectations, the discontent that leads to legal recourse
will breed vigorously. Better redistricting politics is not a judgment imposed by
the politically pure upon the less pure; it is a "reasonably imperfect" outcome
that a broad cross-section of citizens and groups can live with for a decade.
140. See Oedel, supra note 33, at 82-84.
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141. Notes: A = Advisory Commission, B = Backup Commission, P = Politician Commission,
I = Independent Citizen Commission.
Ohio uses both politician and advisory commissions for its legislative lines.
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